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Fair Use v. Fair Access
Randal C. Picker*
I want to make four points.
1.
The copyright act defines use rights, not access rights.
That overstates slightly—especially with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in the statute—but the core of
copyright law addresses how works can be used assuming
that legal access has been obtained. Other law addresses
the circumstances under which works can be accessed.
2.
Nothing in copyright itself suggests that use rights should
trump access rights; indeed, our core access principles
suggest just the opposite. We frequently speak of a fair use
“right.” I am doubtful about that on its own terms but
even if we find something there, a fair use right isn’t an
access right. Fair use doesn’t equal fair access.
3.
The scope of rights given to an initial author will effect the
timing and scope of investment she will make in creating a
work. For many works, those investments can be made in
discrete lumps. As a society, we want investments to be
made incrementally rather than as one large lump as doing
so allows us to get feedback from the market on the value
of a work. We don’t want to throw good money after bad,
and if we learn that, say, the English version of a work is a
failure, we don’t want to bother translating it into
Mandarin. Plus we will delay the time that works reach the
market if we create an incentive to do large, lumpy
investments rather than a sequence of investments coupled
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with market feedback. Authors start with one monopoly:
their unique access to the work that they have created. If
we do not give authors control over these follow-on works,
authors will overinvest upfront in the works, since that is
the only way that the can gain a return on their initial
monopoly over access to the work. In that situation, we are
better off to hand the author a statutory monopoly over
the follow-on work rather than see the author invest real
resources in creating a property right over that work.
Fair use is a form of rights bundling. If we decide that, say,
format-shifting is fair use or is otherwise a permitted use—
you sell me a music CD and I have a use right to make a
personal copy on a cassette or my iPod—we are making a
decision about the rights that we are bundling together.
The nature of bundles is that everyone gets stuck buying
the same set of rights. These bundles can be inefficiently
large. Consumers would often be better off if instead we
allowed rights to be unbundled, so that consumers could
buy just those rights that they wanted rather than being
forced to take unwanted rights. Doing that requires a
narrow conception of fair use.

I. Copyright Magic: Access and Use
When I talk to a new group about copyright, I usually feel as if I am
performing a magic act. I start by asking the audience for a blank
piece of paper. I then ask for the piece of paper as a gift, so that
ownership of the paper transfers to me. With that work done, I then
compose a poem live, usually an ode to some object in the room or a
current event. Four or five lines of epically bad poetry but a poem
nonetheless, and I then ask the question of interest: do I have a
copyrighted work? I then talk quickly through Sec 102 of the
Copyright Act. That requires, of course, an original work of
authorship—the poem that I just made up—fixed in a tangible
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medium of expression—the writing on the paper. The copyright
“equation” as I think of it: OWA + F + TME = ©.
I emphasize that unlike the patent system, copyright doesn’t filter
for quality. There is no requirement that the poem be good enough
to get a copyright. It can be a very, very bad poem—it always is—and
yet it still enjoys all of the benefits of copyright. There is also no
requirement that I first present the poem to a government official
before I can receive rights in the poem, though I do mention the
benefits of registration. This is the core of our current scheme of
copyright: it arises on fixation, at the very instant that I write the
poem on paper.
I then turn to the distinction between use and access. When I
hold a blank piece of paper in my hands, I think that we have a pretty
good understanding of my ownership rights in that paper under
applicable state property law. I control access to the paper; third
parties have no right to access the paper. What changes when I write
a poem on the paper? In the language of the statute, copyright
subsists at that point, but the fact that copyright status has attached
doesn’t change our prior rules that applied when the paper was blank.
I continue to control the paper and through that access to the work.
Third parties have no right to access to the paper, no right to insist
that I publish the work and somehow make it available to everyone.
I then continue the hypothetical. I take the poem home and put
it in my desk. A deranged student wants to blog about my poem, so
he breaks into my house, rifles through my desk, and then copies one
line from the poem on a piece of paper he brought with him. He
then goes home and blogs about the poem and quotes the line he
copied before. He then gets arrested for breaking and entering into
my house. Where does that put us?
That is the distinction between use and access. We should start
with the big picture: traditional copyright is about use of works, it
doesn’t establish rights about access to works. The copyright act
defines allowed and disallowed uses of works but it doesn’t create
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access rights or otherwise regulate controls over access. This overstates
somewhat, especially as more stuff has been dumped into the statute.
The 1996 Digital Millennium Copyright Act is codified in title 17,
the copyright title and it is very much about rules of access to
copyrighted works, but it also is a very non-traditional “copyright”
statute. With the addition of the DMCA, the statute now validates
certain controls on access, but the core notion that the copyright act
itself doesn’t confer access rights hasn’t changed. The core copyright
laws lay out rights regarding uses of a copyrighted work—the right to
copy a work or to distribute it or to perform it in public—or the right
to engage in certain fair uses of a work given access, but nothing in
copyright creates a right to access to the work in the first place. And
you can’t engage in fair use of the work if you don’t have access to it.
The copyright act defines a complex set of use rights, conditioned
on access. The copyright holder controls uses, set forth mainly in
Section 106, and if someone uses a copyrighted work and violates
those rights, we call that infringement and that in turn gives rise to
the remedies set forth in the statute. But in defining the uses of the
work controlled by the copyright holder, we have also established a
group of uses that will not trigger that remedy regime. The Section
106 rights are limited by additional sections of the statute, including,
for our purposes here, the uses considered fair under Section 107.
Note the language just used, as I think it is important to be
precise in the framing of Section 107. All Section 107 does is provide
that certain uses that otherwise would be infringing will not be
infringing, meaning that the remedies that copyright creates won’t
apply through copyright. This isn’t some broad “right” to fair use
though fair use is often addressed in those terms (and I have been
guilty of that in the past). Section 107 simply says that the remedies
that would otherwise attach under copyright if certain uses took place
will not be available. Copyright remedies won’t be available through
copyright law for the uses, but it doesn’t say anything about whether
the uses that won’t be treated as infringing copyright somehow
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violate other applicable law—for example, defamation law or the law
of obscenity—or whether remedies like, but not equivalent, to those
in copyright could be imposed through some source other than
copyright (such as contract). Section 107 on its own does not provide
any protection for those uses under any other applicable law. It does
not call off contract law or tort law or obscenity law or any other
another host of laws that might be triggered by a use that qualifies as
fair. If the copyright statute is going to do that we’ll have to look
elsewhere. And Section 107, like the rest of traditional copyright law
(pre-DMCA law), says nothing about access rights.
But the copyright act’s focus on use and inattention to access may
just reflect the assumption that authors want to publish work and not
hide it and the natural instinct to publish creates access to the work.
An author can create a work and then never let it see the light of day,
but if an author wants to be read, she has to release the work. The
necessity of release means that that the natural desire of an author to
be read will create some means of access and that in turn will create
the possibility of use and then fair use. Indeed, it once was the case
that the act of taking content public—publication in a word—
necessarily resulted in an object that someone could use. I could not
distribute the work generally and retain control over it. If I wanted to
maintain full control, I had to keep the work to myself.
II. Control at a Distance: Legends, Contracts and
Technology
What rules should apply concerning control and publication?
Authors will seek to exercise control over a copy of a work even after
it has been published. Until recently, authors relied mainly on
legends and contracts to attempt to exercise control over works after
they had been widely distributed. Copyright aficionados will quickly
recall the legends addressing retail sales prices of books in BobbsMerrill and barring radio use of LPs in Whiteman.1 Legends are the
1 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus, 210 US 339 (1908); RCA Mfg. Co Inc v Whiteman, 114
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easiest technology to allow control at a distance. Until recently, actual
technological controls were impossible and that is still true today for
works published on paper (newspapers, magazines and paper is still
the dominant method for accessing books). Actual contracts with
consumers are pretty clumsy for most mass produced copyrighted
works (printed works again and music and video distributed on CDs
and DVDs), though the shift to digital distribution of works through
downloading makes click-thru contracting with individual consumers
much more plausible.
Focus on the way in which we might regulate three instruments
for controlling published works: legends, contracts and technology.
Each of these tools might allow for control at a distance over a
published work. Start with legends and revisit the classics to make
sure that we understand their boundaries. In 1904, Bobbs-Merrill
published Hallie Erminie Rives’s book The Castaway, a story of “three
great men ruined in one year—a king, a cad and a castaway.” You can
buy a new copy today on Amazon for $38.65 or an original in the
used-book market for substantially less. But in 1904, Bobbs-Merrill
wanted to make sure that it sold at retail for a $1.00, and just below
the copyright notice, Bobbs-Merrill added the following legend: “The
price of this book at retail is One Dollar net. No dealer is licensed to
sell at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as
infringement of the copyright.”2 The second sentence is the
interesting one. Does the first clause attempt to create some sort of
license or contract regarding the sale of the book? Or does it purport
to describe a state of affairs created by a separate contract somewhere
else? The second clause seems to be a claim about how copyright
applied to the situation.

F2d 86 (1940).
2
See
the
legend
in
Google
Book
Search
(online
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=C0c1AAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:IS
BN1417935715#PPP14,M1 (visited on Mar 2 2008).
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And a claim that turned out to be wrong. Macy’s had been selling
The Castaway for 89 cents, and for 11 cents a copy, Bobbs-Merrill
went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ultimately
understood the case to be a narrow one. The then-current copyright
statute gave the copyright holder the sole right to “vend” a book: did
that right make it possible for a subsequent sale of the book to be
infringing when the copyright owner had voluntarily sold the book in
the first place, even if the copyright holder included a legend of the
sort set out above and a purchaser like Macy’s knew of the legend?
The Court held that Congress didn’t intend for the statutory
copyright to stretch that far. But the decision is just as important for
what it doesn’t say: the Court repeatedly emphasized that there was
no claim of contract in the case, that the issue was one purely of the
reach of the copyright statute on its own.3
Consider Whiteman next. RCA was producing phonographs of
Whiteman’s orchestra and selling those to the public. Radio
broadcasters bought the records and played them over the air. RCA
wanted to block that use, or, more likely, charge a separate price for
it. RCA sought to unbundle the uses otherwise embedded in the
physical record with the goal of implementing some form of price
discrimination, charging one price to ordinary consumers who played
the records at home and a second higher price for radio broadcasters.
RCA implemented its uses restriction through legends on the LPs and
the envelopes that came in and through contracts with its sellers.4

3 “We do not think that the statute can be given such a construction, and it is to be
remembered that this is purely a question of statutory construction. There is no claim in this
case of contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the
book.” Bobbs-Merrill, 210 US at 350. Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that “[t]he
learned counsel for the appellant in this case, in the argument at bar, disclaims relief because
of any contract, and relies solely upon the copyright statutes, and rights therein conferred.”
Id at 346.
4 Online at http://bixography.com/images/dardanellareissuelabel.jpg (visited Mar 2

2008).
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The Second Circuit, through Learned Hand, overturned the
restrictions. Whiteman was premised on an opt-in, quid-pro-quo
vision of copyright. It started with the general premise that
restrictions on chattels are prima facie invalid. It cited nothing for
that proposition though it would have been easy enough to fill in
turn-of-the-century cases such as Bobbs-Merrill in copyright and Dr.
Miles in antitrust, and Dr. Miles had traced the proposition back to
Coke on Littleton in 1628. But whatever the status of the general
proposition, according to Hand, federal copyright law was organized
around a more specific premise: temporary monopoly in exchange for
dedication. Copyright creators chose to bring their works within the
Copyright Act created by Congress and thereby received a defined
monopoly in their works. Once that monopoly expired, the works
were dedicated to the public and no restriction could prevent that
dedication. Yes, the records were themselves not registrable under the
Copyright Act, but it would be “contrary to the whole policy of the
Copyright Act and of the Constitution” to allow the legends to
protect these inferior copyright objects when legends couldn’t protect
works that enjoyed full federal copyright protections.
Hand then turned to the “much discussed” International News
Service v. Associated Press.5 He had little use for it, seeing it as largely
limited to its facts. Hand instead focused on the premise—and it was
nothing more than that as he cited no sources—that an author had
no natural rights and was “not free to make his own terms with the
public.” Hand focused squarely on the issue of continuing control
after general distribution: “there is nothing to justify a priori any
continuance of their control over the activities of the public to which
they have seen fit to dedicate the larger part of their contribution.”
Hand offers no sense of why when we turn to copyrighted works
we should depart from our baseline regime of free contracting in the
sale of goods and services. He certainly doesn’t spend any time

5 248 US 215 (1918).
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considering whether we might want to allow price discrimination in
the sales of records in different markets.6 Looking at the subsequent
contract cases gives some sense of this. Start with doctrine: the critical
issue is the interaction of contracts with copyright’s preemption
provision, set forth in Section 301 of the statute.7 That section
preempts equivalent rights under state common law or state statutes.
The courts haven’t always found this provision easy to apply but the
majority of courts look for an “extra” element beyond items that
always would arise with copyright and a contract has typically,
though not always, qualified.8
ProCD, an early and influential case in the pro-contracts camp,
offers a good example of the utility of contractual use limitations and
goes exactly to the sort of price discrimination that Hand didn’t
consider in Whiteman.9 ProCD put together a computer database of
more than 3,000 telephone directories. Hard work, to be sure, but, as
we know, quite probably not copyrightable under Feist.10 ProCD
wanted to offer multiple versions of the database, one to the
commercial market and a second to the consumer market. This sort
of versioning is quite common with copyrighted works and databases
and clearly can be useful. Absent the ability to separate markets,
ProCD might have only sold a high-priced version to commercial
users, and consumers would have been out of luck. Consumers can

6 I have made this point before in explaining why price discrimination might be useful
in these markets. See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of
Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281 (2003).
7 17 USC § 301.
8 See eg Altera Corp v Clear Logic, Inc, 424 F3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir 2005) (collecting

cases and concluding that “[m]ost courts have held that the Copyright Act does not preempt
the enforcement of contractual rights”). For a more skeptical view, see Ritchie v Williams,
395 F3d 283, 287-88 n 3 (6th Cir 2005) (noting the difficulty of applying the extra elements
test).
9 ProCD Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
10 Feist Publications Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340 (1991).
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gain access to the database at a favorable price, if—and this is the big
if—ProCD could keep the two markets at a distance successfully.
ProCD relied on contract to do that. Given the problems with
copyrighting the database itself, it needed to use contract, but even if
the underlying work had been copyrightable, ProCD would have
needed a contract to separate uses of the work across markets. The
standard rights of the copyright holder under Section 106 don’t, for
example, make it possible for the copyright holder to claim that a
particular commercial use is copyright infringement. Section 106
doesn’t say anything general about separating commercial and
consumer uses, and that it what ProCD wanted to do. Judge
Easterbrook well understood all of that and read Section 301 as not
barring the licenses in use in ProCD.
We also should consider how the First Amendment interacts with
this sort of contracting. Cohen v. Cowles Media Company may be the
leading decision on how our ordinary contracting regime intersects
with the First Amendment.11 Cohen holds that the First Amendment
itself does not operate to limit the general applicability of contracts or
other laws. In the midst of the 1982 Minnesota race for governor,
Dan Cohen approached two newspapers in the Twin Cities to dish
some dirt on one of the candidates. Cohen offered to provide the
information on the condition that the newspapers didn’t disclose his
identity. When they did, Cohen was immediately fired. Cohen sued
the newspapers alleging, among other things, breach of contract and a
jury returned a verdict in his favor of $200,000 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. But the Minnesota
Supreme Court believed that result was inconsistent with the rights of
the newspapers under the First Amendment and it overturned the
verdict.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. “Generally
applicable laws” said the Court, did “not offend the First

11 501 US 663 (1991).
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Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on the ability to gather and report the news.”12 The
Court noted that “the press may not with impunity break and enter
an office or dwelling to gather news” and that “we conclude that the
First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right
to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state
law.”13 In the case at bar, the applicable Minnesota law did no more
than enforce promises voluntarily made, and the press could control
these obligations by not making the promises in the first place.
Although the Court didn’t say this, this also seems like a situation
where the press wants the promise to be unenforceable only after the
fact. If the press can’t meaningfully promise confidentiality to
sources, it will almost certainly lose access to many stories. Cohen was
a 5-4 case and the Court doesn’t have a well-developed caselaw on the
interaction of the First Amendment and contract. But Cohen clearly
rejects the notion that there is a flat inconsistency between contract
and the First Amendment.14 As the breaking-and-entering example
suggests, Cohen is premised on the notion that the ordinary
underlying rules of property control access.
Unlike both copyright and legends, contracts operate one by one.
Copyright arises through status and is good against the world.
Legends could operate that way as well, but as Bobbs-Merrill and
Whiteman suggests, courts have been unwilling to allow legends to
operate fully. Given those problems with contracts and legends, a
better technology for enforcing use restrictions would be quite
attractive and copyright holders have turned to technology itself to
implement use and access restrictions. The topic of digital rights
management and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is obviously

12 Id at 669.
13 Respectively, id and id at 672.
14 Note also that the Court doesn’t address the interaction of copyright and contract in
Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003).
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a large one15 and it would be silly to try to do a full discussion, so I
will focus on one key point.
DRM—or, if you prefer, technological protection measures
(TPM)—is precisely about the question of whether we will allow
authors to exercise control at distance over works that they wish to
distribute more generally. Recall where we started this discussion.
Authors can maintain full control over a work by never distributing it
in the first place. That is a high price to pay, and, in the past,
publication of the work created access and the possibility of use
followed. If contracts and legends were too cumbersome or blocked
by the courts, authors would lose control through publication.
DRM changes that. DRM makes possible control at distance,
meaning that an author can distribute a work generally and yet still
exercise control over how the work is used. To be sure, that operates
well only for works that are intermediated through technology. The
morning newspapers that shows up on the stoop of my house can’t be
shrinkwrapped (actually, of course, it arrives wrapped in plastic to
keep it dry, but I usually successfully get beyond the plastic). Works
delivered on paper are still published as they always have been. But
works that are intermediated by technology—music and video and
increasing text—those are works as to which the possibility of control
at distance exists and that puts the utility or disutility of that control
squarely on the table.
III. Access and Use Regimes
Return to my earlier hypothetical involving my new poem and the
deranged student who breaks into my house to copy it. Where do we
stand when the cops catch the student? Does she go to jail for
15 There is a large literature and almost an infinite number of works could be cited

though I remain unsurprisingly partial to my own contributions. For those, see Randal C.
Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts, in François
Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, eds, Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US Perspectives
180 (Edward Elgar 2005) and Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5
J Telecomms & High Tech L 47 (2006).
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breaking and entering? Can I sue her for copyright infringement?
Again, we need to distinguish use and access. Section 107 of the
Copyright Act addresses fair use and all it does is pull certain uses out
of the general infringement regime created by copyright law, meaning
that if you do one of those uses, you can’t be held liable for copyright
infringement. By itself, section 107 doesn’t create an independent
right of access to works and doesn’t limit the ability of a copyright
holder to condition access to the work. Limits on those conditions
will have to be found elsewhere, if anywhere.
I can readily imagine three possibilities as to how use and access
should interact:
1. Full Separation. Use and access are separate questions. Your
right to use the material doesn’t turn on how you obtained access. It
is what it is independent of how you got access. If a book review of a
book borrowed from the library would be fair use, so would a review
of a review of the same book obtained via a burglary of the library.
But, more independence, your immunity to use the material if you
have access also doesn’t change your right to gain access to the
material. If stealing the book is a crime, you don’t get off the hook by
saying that the use that you made of the book was a fair use. So the
state would a criminal action for burglary, but the burglary wouldn’t
create an action for copyright infringement where one wouldn’t
otherwise exist.
2. Fair-Use Penalties. I could imagine a regime of fair use
penalties, meaning that we take into account how access was obtained
and limit usual fair use because of the way in which access was
obtained. A use that would usually be fair—a book review—would
lose that status if the book was stolen. The state gets to put the
burglar in jail for the theft and the author can sue for copyright
infringement.
3. Fair-Use Trumps. The flipside of fair use penalties would be
fair use trumps: we use the fact that the use would not be copyright
infringement because it would be fair to trump the punishment that
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could attach to the method used to acquire access. The book review
would insulate the burglar from prosecution because the book review
was fair use.
I am quite skeptical about the role for regime 3. Once it was
announced, burglars would go into blogging in a big way: steal stuff,
be sure to take a book as well, and then blog a review of the book.
Presumably a fair-use trump regime would apply only to stolen
copyrighted works, but even there, I am hard-pressed to understand
why we should twist fair use so as to vindicate theft. I could go either
way on 1 or 2, but regime 3 effectively converts a particular copyright
privilege into something much, much broader. I suspect that the
caselaw puts us in cases 1 or 2; I doubt that we are even close to
regime 3.16
What cases might fall within my third situation? The library
burglary obviously, but that is the most extreme version. Consider
two other situations: (1) contractual access limits and (2) digital
rights management technologies. I give you access to the manuscript
of my poem but I make you promise not to post a review on your
blog. You breach the promise. Do I have an action in contract?
Copyright infringement? What is the interaction between the two?
The case against enforcing the contract would focus on the thirdparty benefits of fair use. Fair use benefits not merely the person
making the use, but also those who are exposed to the use. The book
review isn’t so much about the reviewer as the potential audience for
the book. A recipient of the manuscript who agrees to contractual
limits on use might not take into account fully the third-party
benefits associated with not being subject to the limits. If you
thought that the author would grant access even without the
contractual limit, we would be better off barring the enforcement of
the contractual term.
16 Bill Patry lays out some of the relevant caselaw in a post on his blog. See Fair Use:
The Source Copy (Dec 20, 2005), online at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/12/fairuse-source-copy.html.
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Of course, the key premise there is that the author would give
access to the work even without the contract limiting use. The
Supreme Court was certainly skeptical about that in Cohen. It saw
promises to sources as a key way that reporters would get stories in
the first place and understood that the press as a whole would be
worse off if it couldn’t make meaningful upfront promises to sources.
And even putting to one side the empirical judgments required, I am
skeptical that Section 107 itself, read fairly, says anything about
contracts limiting uses. As suggested before, Section 107 just excludes
certain uses from copyright’s rules regarding infringement.
The leading caselaw discussion of the DRM question is probably
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Courley.17 Courley contended that the
DMCA meant—in particular, Section 1201(c)(1)—that DRM
schemes could be circumvented if that would allow fair use of the
materials. The Second Circuit rejected that, but also concluded that
the fact that fair use resulted from a breach of the DMCA didn’t
somehow render that use unfair.18 This is to embrace the full
independence view.
I’m not sure that I agree with the Second Circuit that Section
1201(c)(1) adopts full independence. The section says that 1201 itself
isn’t intended to change the usual rules regarding copyright
infringement, including the fair use rule. As I have suggested above,
fair use addresses use, not access. The fair-use penalty idea is a withinin fair use doctrine, a fair use version of clean hands, where fair use is
forfeited if access is obtained illegitimately. I wouldn’t understand
Section 1201(c)(1) to limit a judge from applying this version of the
cleans hand doctrine to what would otherwise be a fair use.

17 273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir 2001)
18 “Subsection 1201(c)(1) ensures that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the ‘fair use’
of information just because that information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the
DMCA.” Id at 443.
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IV. Building on Copyrighted Works
At its core, the fair use question is about the circumstances under
which a subsequent individual can use the prior work of a second
author. This is often part of the general case in which a first work is
used to create a second work. Take a simple case: I write a novel in
English and the question is whether to translate the novel into
Mandarin. As the author, I can make this decision before or after the
novel is first published. We should think of this as case of
incremental investment. I spend some amount to create the novel in
English and then face a separate second and discrete investment
question.
In setting up our copyright system in the face of this sort of
sequenced investment, we should take into account the way that new
information should influence that investment decision. Put simply,
we don’t want bad English novels translated into Mandarin, and we
can a run a market test to figure out which novels should and
shouldn’t be translated: publish the book in its original English and
see how the public reacts. If they love it, translate it into Mandarin,
but if everyone hates the novel, don’t bother spending money to
create the Mandarin version. Take advantage of the information that
we know will be forthcoming to make the second-stage investment
decision.
How do the rules of copyright influence this? If as author I don’t
hold a translation right—if anyone with access to the English work
can legally translate the work—I won’t get any value in the second
round of value that arises from my original work. That might mean
that I don’t create the work in the first place if I need access to some
chunk of both pots of money created by the work—the original
English sales and the subsequent Mandarin sales—but the more
standard incentives-to-create issue isn’t my focus right now. Instead,
focus on my incentive to translate the novel into Mandarin before it is
published in English. Being first to market with the Mandarin
version may be the way in which I grab some of the second stream of
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value that results from the work. Note also that doing this means that
I will almost certainly delay the release of the original English work
while I take time to do the Mandarin translation. That delay is a
social cost too.
We can now say something sharp about the incentives of first
authors to make these second-stage investments. Absent a property
right over translations, authors will overinvest—compared to what we
as a society want—in these second-stage investments. As a society, we
should wait for the English sale results before investing in Mandarin,
but, absent a translation property right, the first author won’t get any
value from the Mandarin version if she waits for results. Instead, she
will take advantage of her initial monopoly over access to the book to
try to turn that into a first-mover advantage in the Mandarin market.
Note how copyright can influence this. If she holds a translation
right, then she can wait for the market returns. She doesn’t fear that
giving up her initial unique access to the work will turn into a market
disadvantage in the subsequent Mandarin competition. With a
translation property right in hand, the author will now share the
social incentive in using the market-value information efficiently.
Now focus on the social trade-off in deciding whether to give the
first author a property right over translations. Giving the author a
monopoly means that we suffer the deadweight loss of monopoly for
the work in the Mandarin market. The price of the Mandarin edition
is higher than it would be absent the property right and some
consumers never buy the work who otherwise would if the work were
sold in free competition. The size of that effect depends of course on
how the Mandarin work competes will all other Mandarin texts, so
the monopoly power costs could be large or small. Against those costs
we have to weigh the wasted investments that authors will make in
translating bad books so as to take advantage of their initial
monopoly over access to the text. And, to come back to the more
conventional incentive story of copyright, the possible loss of original
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works if author wouldn’t create the work at all without access to both
markets.
There has been a suggestion that we should frame fair use simply
as any use that creates additional value for the work.19 I am not clear
on how that notion would apply to my translation example. In some
basic way, a translation of a work doesn’t compete with the original
work. Mandarin-only readers aren’t going to buy the English version
of the novel, and so the Mandarin translation isn’t a meaningful
substitute for the English version; it complements it. There will only
be a handful of readers who will decline to buy the English version
sold under the control of the copyright holder and will instead buy
the Mandarin version sold at a competitive price free of copyright
restraints.
So we might say that the Mandarin version adds value and hence
the translation qualifies as fair use. That misses the key point that the
author could do the translation herself and, through her control over
original access to the work, controls the timing of that translation and
holds that control with or without a copyright over the translated
work. We should care about her decision about whether to make the
second-stage investment and that has little—maybe nothing—to do
whether the second work is a complement or substitute for the first
work.
The translation example is a natural starting point, as this is
where U.S. copyright law started its march towards adding control
over derivative works to the rights held by the copyright holder. The
1870 Copyright Act authorized authors to reserve the rights to
dramatize or translate their own works.20 The familiar “all rights
reserved” legend became a standard way for authors to hang onto the
19 See Tim Wu in Bits Debate: Mixing It Up Over Remixes and Fair Use, NY Times

Bits Blog, Jan 16 2008 (online at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/830/) (visited
Mar 3, 2008) (“… [W]ork that adds to the value of the original, as opposed to substituting
for the original, is fair use”).
20 16 Stat 212 (1870).
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rights available to them under the statute. We might say that
translation is just fancy copying. Indeed, it isn’t hard to imagine a
Xerox 2020 copier offering “language shifting” as one its key selling
points—“Now with improved Mandarin!”—and that would seem
just like old-fashioned copying. But the incremental investment point
is broader and the real question is how much of the derivative works
right now in Section 106(2) should be brought within that
framework.
V. Fair Use as Inefficient Bundling
Finally, consider the way that fair use may operate as an inefficient
bundle of rights. Try this example. We have a book published on
paper. All consumers value the paper copy of the book at $8. Some
consumers are happy as clams with just paper. Other consumers
would love to have a digital, searchable copy of the book to go along
with the paper copy. Those consumers would value bundle of a paper
copy and a digital copy at $12. If the copyright owner didn’t fear
copying—either of the physical book or a digital copy—what would
she do?
The answer is straightforward: sell physical copies of the book for
$8 and digital copies for $4 (or for the proverbial epsilon less than
that if you like). Old-school consumers would just buy the physical
copies, newbies would buy both. We would sell to all consumers, and
the copyright holder would capture all of the value associated with
the work. We would also not leave any social value sitting on table.
No transactions that we would like to see take place will have been
missed.
Now consider a possible fair use doctrine. Suppose that we
announced a doctrine that said that any consumer was entitled to the
work in any medium, once the work was purchased in some
medium.21 A digital copy is produced—perhaps through an online
21
See
eg
DigitalConsumer.org’s
Bill
http://digitalconsumer.org/bill.html) (visited Mar 3 2008).
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open source-type process where individuals contribute chunks of
typed text. Consumers who wanted the digital copy would no longer
need to pay $4 to get it. Where would this put our copyright holder?
Before the copyright holder could sell different products to
different consumers. The sensible approach was to sell just paper
copies to the dinosaurs and sell paper and digital copies to the
younger consumers. Now the rights regime makes it such that the
copyright holder can sell only one product, but some of those
consumers will value the product at $8, while other consumers will
value the product at $12 (knowing that once they have the paper
product, they can get a digital product they will value at $4 for free).
What will the copyright holder do? She can sell the paper copy
for $8 or the paper copy for $12, but she can no longer sell any
digital copies for a positive price. What she will do depends on the
numbers (and to simplify matters, treat the costs of making physical
and digital copies as being 0). If the copyright holder sets a price of
$8 for the physical book, she receives revenues of 8*(O + N), where
O is the number of old-school consumers and N is the number of
digerati. If instead she sets a price of 12, her revenues are 12*N.
Try an example. Set N = 10 and O = 4. Total revenues from
selling at $8 are then $112, from selling at $12, $120. In the face of
free digital copies—whether from the open-source text collective or
from a service like Google Book Search—the copyright holder will
jack up the price of the physical book. She can no longer treat the
two customer types differently. Note that the copyright holder is
much worse off than before. Without the free digital copies, on these
numbers, the copyright holder sold to everyone and took in revenues
of $152. But, and this is the important point, society is much worse
off too. All consumers were served before. Now the increased price
for the physical book—caused by the inability to charge separately for
the physical book and the digital book—has priced some consumers
out of the market.
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Fair use is a form of bundling: one right necessarily comes with
some other right. Not all consumers will want the “extra” bundled
rights. Copyright holders will take into account in their initial pricing
decisions for a work the full uses being conveyed, including those
conveyed as a result of fair use. With that idea in mind, step back to
consider two quick points. First, I think that this exactly the dynamic
at stake for the record legends in Whiteman. If a sold record
automatically came with a broadcast right, we run the risk of
inefficient bundling. I take it that we think that the history suggests
that there was more money to be made in selling many records at low
prices rather than just a few at high prices to the broadcasters, but it
could have worked out otherwise. Second, if we ask where that might
have happened, we might want to consider the emergence of the
public performance right in 1856.22 This again is a use bundling
question: if I sell you a copy of the play, do I also sell you right to
perform the play? Reading the playing and performing it are two
quite different uses that might arise from the same physical
instantiation of the work. The 1856 act facilitated separation of these
markets.
Conclusion
Use of a copyrighted work and access to it are different animals. U.S.
copyright law focuses almost exclusively on use rights and doesn’t
create general positive access rights. Of course, use rights will
nonetheless be effective if authors choose to give access to works
through wide distribution of those works through publication. But
even with publication, authors want to exercise control at a distance
over the work, to publish the work and yet retain control over it. In
the past authors have attempted to do so using legends and contracts;
now authors seek control at a distance through digital rights
technology. While effective legends, contracts and DRM could limit
the way in which fair use operates, these limiting tools do no more
22 11 Stat 138 (1856).
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than implement the author’s fundamental right to control access to
the work, a right that fair use just doesn’t address.
If we turn to functional accounts for nonconsensual use of
copyrighted works—uses such as fair use and uses outside the scope
of the derivative works right—we need to take into account how
copyright influences incremental investments in works and how fair
use can inefficiently bundle together too many uses. The author’s
initial control over access to a new work means that the author could
enter many markets for the work simultaneously, so the author could
produce both an English version of a work and a Mandarin version at
the same time. An author might have incentive to do this if, for
example, anyone could produce the Mandarin version once the
English version was published. We don’t want authors to do this. As
a society, we want to continue to invest in the copyrighted work only
after we received market feedback on the English version. Otherwise
we throw away the information that should guide our incremental
investments in the work. Copyright designs that limit nonconsensual
follow-on uses do a better job of aligning incremental investment
incentives.
Finally, fair use can operate as a bundling of rights. If we were to
conclude that the sale of a text copy of a play came with, as fair use,
the right to perform the play, playwrights would not be able to
separate the reading and performing markets. Instead of selling at
different prices to both markets, playwrights might choose to drop
one market—probably the reading market—to instead sell at high
prices to the performing market. Consumers would be worse off a
result. Of course, the 1856 amendments to our copyright statutes
made exactly this separation possible, but the way in which fair use
might prevent this type of rights separation in other markets is
perfectly general.
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